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DESIGNATING MALE PARENTS AT BIRTH
Jeffrey A. Parness*
It is becoming increasingly difficult to determine the legal
parentage of newborns and infants. Although it may be clear
who bore a child, whose sperm was involved in conception, to
whom a new mother was married at the time of conception,
pregnancy, and birth, and which medical personnel helped to
facilitate a pregnancy, it is unclear how these facts should
affect the determination of a child's legal parentage.
Recently, a great deal of national debate has centered around
the parenting consequences of births involving surrogates
and same-sex marriages.' This Essay addresses a topic less
frequently discussed-the legal designation of male parent-
age as of the time of birth. Although much attention recently
has been focused on the termination of male parental rights
and designations of new male parents at some time after
birth,2 the laws on designating male parents at birth have
remained stable and largely removed from public debate.
This Essay, which examines laws concerning the designation
of male parentage, is warranted not only because of the
burgeoning new methods by which pregnancy and birth are
accomplished, but also because of new technologies that
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A. 1970,
Colby College; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago. This Essay is based on a paper
delivered at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. Many
thanks to Nick Griswold and Tim Johnson for their help.
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal.) (concluding that
under a surrogacy agreement involving the implantation of an embryo created by a
married couple, the married couple are the resulting child's natural parents), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993); Adoptions of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272, 1276 (Vt.
1993) (holding that a woman may adopt her lesbian partner's children born during
their relationship).
2. In particular, much attention has been directed toward the termination of
male parental rights in anticipation of an adoption. Compare In re Clausen, 502
N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich. 1993) (enforcing an Iowa court judgment placing custody of
a two-year-old girl with her natural parents after the biological father contested the
girl's adoption by a Michigan couple) with In re Petition of Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993
Ill. App. LEXIS 1271, at *9; 1993 WL 330638, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993)
(terminating a biological father's parental rights for failure to assume a reasonable
degree of concern for the newborn within 30 days of birth).
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permit more accurate assessments of biological paternity.3
Public policy supports the view that a child's male parent-
age as of the time of birth should be designated early in life.4
This policy should apply even to children born to women who
are not married to the biological father at the time of concep-
tion or birth.5 A recent federal commission summarized the
policy reasons supporting the early designation of male par-
ents:
Parentage determination does more than provide genea-
logical clues to a child's background; it establishes funda-
mental emotional, social, legal and economic ties between
parent and child. It is a prerequisite to securing financial
support for the child and to developing the heightened
emotional support the child derives from enforceable
custody and visitation rights. Parentage determination
also unlocks the door to government provided dependent's
benefits, inheritance, and an accurate medical history for
the child.6
Thus, mothers, husbands, and biological fathers, as well as
children, have significant interests in the early designation of
male parentage.7
3. DNA analysis is one example of these new technologies. Concerning the
use of DNA analysis in paternity cases, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.12 (West Supp.
1993) (allowing human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests to be performed without con-
sent in paternity cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-10 (Supp. 1992) (allowing
"genetic tests" to be admitted in paternity cases); U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD
SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 126 (1992) [hereinafter
SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN] (stating that "DNA testers can virtually assure accurate
parentage determination"). Concerning the use of DNA analysis in criminal cases,
see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West Supp. 1993) (allowing DNA analysis to be per-
formed without consent in criminal cases); U.S. v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791-800
(2d Cir.) (admitting DNA test results in a rape case), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 317 (Mass. 1992) (finding DNA
test results inadmissible where a father and his son both were accused of incest).
4. This essay is concerned with the designation of a child's male parentage as
of the time of birth because, although some women may become mothers through
surrogacy arrangements or via various means of artificial impregnation, the identi-
ties of the biological mothers generally are self-evident. Not only is the identity of
biological fathers not self-evident, but also many men become legal fathers even
though they are not biologically linked-as when married men are presumed to be
the fathers of the children born to their wives. See infra note 11.
5. The policy thus should apply to unmarried women as well as to married
women (who may bear children biologically unrelated to their husbands).
6. SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 120.
7. The government, too, usually has an interest in determining the male
parentage of a child as of the time of birth, especially where it is paying welfare
benefits which are subject to possible recoupment. See infra note 42.
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Focusing on male parentage as of the time of birth is espe-
cially warranted today because many contemporary legal
designations of paternity are not made uniformly, occur fortu-
itously, fail to involve all interested persons, and are incon-
clusive.8 Federal and state governments do little to assure
that birth records include the names of male parents as of
the time of birth. As a result, many children are without
legal designation of paternity for extended periods of time,
while other children never receive such a designation. More-
over, many new mothers are afforded unfettered discretion
regarding the legal designation of male parentage. Even
when legal designations do occur, all too frequently they are
subject to later attack, often because they were made without
involving all interested parties.9
Legal designations of male parentage need not precede the
assumption of parenting responsibilities.1 ° Many men pres-
ently raise children in the absence of any legal declaration of
parental responsibility. Additionally, biological links are
irrelevant to many legal designations of male parentage. For
example, sterile men married to women who bear children
may be presumed to be vested with the same legal rights and
duties as biological fathers." In fact, many men (such as
stepfathers) quite happily assume parental duties for
8. See infra Part I (reviewing contemporary designations of male parentage
made through birth certificates, marriage dissolution proceedings, paternity actions,
other civil cases, and laws on presumed parenthood).
9. - See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
10. The assumption of parenting responsibilities by those not legally recognized as
parents, or otherwise obligated to assume such duties, often will not result in a parent-
age designation under law or in legal responsibility for child support. Compare Bowie v.
Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568, 576-80 (Mich. 1992) (finding that a couple who raised a child in
their home through a casual arrangement with the child's legal parents had no substan-
tive right to child custody) and Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Wis. 1993)
(holding that a former stepmother who helped parent a child for six years lacked stand-
ing to petition for visitation when child custody was granted to the biological mother)
with OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1990) (allowing any person "who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship" to petition for custody, visitation, or other
generally recognized parental rights).
11. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 45, § 5 (1992) (presuming that the husband is
the natural father of a child born or conceived during his marriage to the mother); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 1992) (presuming a man to be the biological father if he and
the mother were married when the child was born, or if the child was born within 280
days after the marriage was terminated); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.040 (West 1992)
(presuming a man to be the natural father if he and the mother were married when the
child was born, or if the child was born within 300 days after the marriage was
terminated); see also Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Alaska 1993) (recognizing a
common-law presumption of a husband's paternity).
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children to whom they have neither a biological link nor a
legal presumption of parentage. This may occur even where
anothei man is legally responsible for the children. Finally,
legal designations of male parentage as of the time of birth
need not inevitably lead to the assumption of parenting
responsibilities for the men so designated. 2 Occasionally,
the designations may be sought with the expectation that the
man's parental rights will be terminated shortly after the
designation is made.' 3
In focusing on legal designations of male parentage as of
the time of birth, this Essay first reviews the methods by
which such designations currently are made. The difficulties
raised by contemporary methods then will be explored,
together with suggested reforms involving laws that could
promote earlier, more complete, and more accurate designa-
tions of male parentage as of the time of a child's birth. 4
I. CONTEMPORARY METHODS OF DESIGNATING
MALE PARENTAGE
Currently, designations of a child's male parentage as of
the time of birth often are made inconsistently, fortuitously,
inconclusively, and without involving all interested parties.
Although designations can be made in many ways, they occur
most often when birth certificates are issued. A birth certifi-
cate typically issues under state law shortly after the birth of
a child.' 5 It normally contains either the names or the
12. Consider, for example, the possibility of posthumous artificial insemination.
See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 291 (Ct. App. 1993) (preventing
the destruction of a decedent's frozen sperm which he left to his girlfriend).
13. This often occurs where an adoption is anticipated, but cannot be accom-
plished without the termination of parental rights, which may not occur unless
legal parentage has been established.
14. This Essay does not address the circumstances under which one who legally
is designated a male parent as of the time of a child's birth may or should lose his
parental rights (for example, due to child abuse), or the circumstances under which
a man not capable of being designated a male parent as of the time of birth later
can become a parent under law (for example, by marriage to the child's mother or
by adoption).
15. This is not to suggest that the federal government has no interest in state
birth certificate laws. For example, the Interstate Child Support Enforcement Act,
S. 689 & H.R. 1600, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), now pending in Congress, would
require states to create hospital-based paternity establishment programs.
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signatures of the man and woman designated as the child's
parents. Frequently, the designations of male parentage are
neither corroborated scientifically nor supported by admissi-
ble evidence, but are made solely on the basis of a legal pre-
sumption, as when the mother is married, 6 or on the basis of
written statements made by an unmarried mother and
alleged father.'7  Further, the public often does not have
access to birth certificates, 8 preventing errors from being
revealed and parental rights and duties from becoming
known in the community.' 9
Birth certificates often are not completed fully and informa-
tion on male parentage frequently is missing.2 ° Moreover,
16. See supra note 11.
17. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 535, § 12(4) (1992) (requiring that "[tihe names
of the mother and father shall be entered on the birth certificate .... The mother
and father shall sign the birth certificate .... If the mother was not married to the
father of the child either at the time of conception or birth, the name and the
signature of the father shall be entered thereon only with the written consent of the
mother and the person to be named as the father."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.58.080 (West 1992) (requiring that the birth certificate include the names of
the mother and father if they are married at the time of the birth; and providing
that if the mother is unmarried at the time of birth, she and the natural father
must have the opportunity to complete an affidavit acknowledging paternity, which
includes a "sworn statement by the mother consenting to the assertion of paternity
and stating that this is the only possible father" and "[a] statement by the father
that he is the natural father of the child").
18. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.131 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (prohib-
iting access to vital records except where authorized by statute, regulation, or court
order); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 500.20(c) (1991) (providing that the information
necessary to complete a birth certificate shall be "collected, recorded and main-
tained in a confidential manner").
19. This may prevent some fathers from asserting their parental rights. See In
re Petition of Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1271, at *9, 1993 WL
330638, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (terminating a biological father's rights
for failure to assume a reasonable degree of concern for the newborn within 30 days
after birth, even though he and his friends searched through public records for
information on his child, but found nothing).
20. In October 1991, I surveyed all Illinois medical facilities believed to provide
obstetrical services. Although responses indicated that most recent birth certifi-
cates contained both the mother's and father's names, they also indicated that
unmarried mothers were less likely to name the father and that the hospitals did
little or nothing to obtain a father's name when it was not volunteered by the
mother. In one hospital, 23 of the last 65 births to unmarried women produced
certificates without a father's name. In another, the first 219 births in 1991
involved 21 unmarried women who refused to provide information about the father
of the baby. One hospital reported that one married woman had named her hus-
band as the father, but then stated that the baby was not her husband's off-
spring-at least not biologically. All responding hospitals reported little difficulty
in obtaining the designation of the father where the mother was married. The
survey and the data collected are on file with the author.
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state laws do little to encourage the full, accurate, and timely
completion of birth certificates. 2' Likewise, birth certificates
rarely contain information about other men2 2 or women 23 who
assume parenting duties. Occasionally, birth certificates may
be completed or amended at a later date,24 although such
completion or amendment may not be compelled.25
21. Illinois law seemingly requires that hospital personnel exert some effort to
obtain the father's name on a birth certificate. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 535,
§ 12(4) (1992) ("The person responsible for preparing and filing the birth certificate
• . . shall make a reasonable effort to obtain the signatures of both parents."). Little
is done, however, if the name is not supplied voluntarily. See supra note 20. An
Illinois law which became effective in 1993 requires the hospital, the attending
physician, the midwife, or his or her agent to provide an opportunity for the consen-
sual establishment of male parentage by an unmarried woman and the natural
father. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 535, § 12(5) (West Supp. 1993). For a review of
recent state initiatives to spur male parentage determinations at birth, see Paula
Roberts, Paternity Establishment: An Issue for the 1990s, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1019, 1024-26 (1993).
22. Consider, for example, the boyfriend who agrees in advance to raise the
child conceived by his girlfriend through artificial insemination. Additionally,
parental rights have been recognized where the biological father can prove that he
donated sperm to an unmarried mother in reliance on an agreement that they
would coparent any child born as a result of the artificial insemination. See In re
R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 33-35 (Colo. 1989); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243-46
(Or. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
23. For example, two women may agree to parent jointly any child born as a
result of the artificial insemination of one of them. Compare Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying parenthood, and thus visitation rights,
to a woman following the end of her relationship with the biological mother, who
had agreed to share all child-rearing responsibilities for a child born as a result of
artificial insemination during their relationship) with A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660,
664, 665 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992) (recognizing the
possibility of joint custody between two women if there was a valid coparenting
agreement and if it was in the child's best interests).
24. In Illinois, for example, where male parentage is unrecorded at birth, later
judicial determinations of male parentage in adoption and paternity cases should
result in the issuance of new birth certificates, or in the further completion of
existing birth certificates. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 535, § 16 (1992) (requiring
the State Registrar of Vital Records to be notified of adoptions and provided with
information necessary to establish a new birth certificate); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act
45, § 14(d) (1993) (requiring the court to order a new birth certificate to be issued
where a judgment is "at variance" with the birth certificate). In other cases, new
birth certificates are issued only when a request supported by evidence is made.
See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 535, § 17(c) (1992) (requiring the State Registrar of
Vital Records to establish a new birth certificate upon receipt of a request for a new
certificate and such evidence as is required by regulation); cf. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 46,
§ 13 (1992) (allowing an incomplete or incorrect birth record to be altered if evi-
dence establishing the facts beyond a reasonable doubt is presented by "credible
persons having knowledge of the case").
25. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 8 (1992) (providing that the court may order the
issuance of a new birth certificate if its judgment is "at variance" with the birth
certificate).
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A child's male parentage as of the time of birth also may be
designated during a marriage dissolution proceeding,
whether or not there is a completed birth certificate.2" In
these proceedings, the rules of evidence usually apply and
resulting judgments are credited to the parties and those in
privity or sufficiently identified with them.27 Often, however,
all interested persons are not involved in these proceedings.
Marriage dissolution proceedings might not necessarily
include as parties the child of the divorcing couple;2" the
child's biological father, if different from the husband;29 or
the state, which may have supported the children through
the female parent and which now may have claims against
the male parent for reimbursement.3"
Paternity actions constitute a third way in which a child's
male parentage as of the time of birth may be established.31
26. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 401 (1992).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39-41 (1982) (eschewing the
term privity and describing various nonparties sufficiently related to earlier liti-
gants so as to be bound by judgments involving those litigants).
28. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 5061 (1992) (providing that in a marriage
dissolution case, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a
child regarding support, custody, and visitation, and also may appoint a guardian-
ad-litem for the child); In re Custody of D.A., 558 N.E.2d 1355, 1361-62 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (recognizing that a court had both statutory and inherent power to
appoint a guardian-ad-litem for a minor interested in litigation involving the
identity of her father); cf SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 125 (noting
that "a child need not be joined in a parentage action for the action to proceed").
But see Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 872-73 (W. Va. 1989) (finding
that the appointment of a guardian-ad-litem for a child is necessary when an
attempt to disprove paternity is made in a divorce proceeding).
29. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 403(d) (1992) (providing that in a marriage
dissolution case, a court may join 'additional parties necessary and proper for the
exercise of its authority"). But see People ex rel. L.J., 835 P.2d 1265, 1266 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992) (consolidating a marriage dissolution proceeding and a paternity action
involving both the husband and the child's biological father); In re Marriage of
Pierce, No. 91 D 16616 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1991) (litigation papers on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (involving a marriage dissolution petition
which included a claim for contribution by the husband of a pregnant woman
against the man who allegedly caused the pregnancy).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1988) (providing that state AFDC programs
must require each applicant or recipient to assign to the state any rights of support
that she may have in her own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for
whom she is applying or receiving aid).
31. Paternity actions include cases where male parentage is sought to be estab-
lished or disestablished. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 45, § 7(a)(1992) (providing that
an "action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship ... may
be brought by the child; the mother; a pregnant woman; any person or public
agency who has custody of, or is providing or has provided financial support to, the
child; or a man presumed or alleging himself to be the father of the child or
expected child"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 45, § 7(b) (1992) (providing that an "action
SPRING 19931
580 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reforn [VOL. 26:3
These actions typically are commenced by a mother, or by the
government when it has supported the child. Cases may be
initiated against a putative father even where another man
is the presumed father 32 or is named in the birth certificate.
Occasionally, alleged biological fathers33 or children them-
selves commence paternity actions.
Other methods also exist under law to designate male
parentage as of the time of birth. Parentage can be resolved
in cases involving insurance beneficiaries, 34  probate dis-
putes,35 the termination of parental rights,36 adoptions,37 and
workers' compensation claims. 38
The techniques for designating male parentage under law
usually are subject to significant maternal control. New
to declare the non-existence of the parent and child relationship may be brought by
the child, the natural mother or a man presumed to be the father .... After the
presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man may be
determined in the same action, if he has been made a party.").
32. See Wyatt v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 397 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Va. Ct.
App. 1990) (involving a mother's paternity action against the alleged biological
father although she was married to another man at the time of conception and
birth).
33. See Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (involving
a putative father's action to establish biological parentage and to obtain parental
rights for a child born to a married woman).
34. See DeCeglia v. Estate of Colletti, 625 A.2d 590, 597 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that a decedent's life insurance policies can provide child
support to a child born after the decedent's death).
35. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 2-2(h) (1992) (providing that a person
adjudged to be an illegitimate child of a decedent after the decedent's death is an
heir); Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 475 (La. 1991) (upholding
a court order requiring DNA testing of a decedent's legitimate daughter to deter-
mine whether another woman was the illegitimate child of the decedent), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992); Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810, 812-14 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992) (supporting DNA paternity testing on the corpse of an intestate decedent
to determine whether a man was fathered by the decedent, rather than by the hus-
band of the man's mother), review denied, 426 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 1993).
36. See Ulrich v. Cornell, 469 N.W.2d 890, 891, 894 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that a stepfather was equitably estopped from refusing to support his
stepson after divorcing the stepson's mother, where the stepfather had promised
support through the age of majority and had encouraged the termination of the
biological father's parental rights), rev'd, 484 N.W.2d 545, 548-49 (Wis. 1992)
(reversing the factual findings but supporting the use of equitable estoppel in some
stepchild support cases).
37. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 50, § 12a (1992) (detailing the requirements for
establishing notice and for terminating a putative father's rights in an adoption
proceeding).
38. See R.L.J. v. Western Sprinklers, Inc., 844 P.2d 37, 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that, for purposes of workers' compensation, parentage may be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and noting that a different burden of proof may
apply in probate, insurance, or other cases).
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mothers alone often decide what information is entered on
birth forms, especially when they are unmarried at the time
of the birth.3" Mothers in marriage dissolution proceedings
often determine whether the issue of a third person's
paternity will be raised regarding a child conceived or born
during the marriage.4" Additionally, unmarried mothers
often control whether paternity actions will ever be
initiated,4' unless they receive governmental assistance and
thus are subject to governmental compulsion to initiate suit. 42
The aforementioned methods of designating male parentage
for a child are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily
interrelated. Multiple and inconsistent legal designations of
male parentage therefore may be made for a single child. For
example, although a birth certificate may deem the husband of
a new mother to be the "presumed" father,43 the mother," the
39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40. Often, it is only the mother who knows that a third person is, or may be,
the father. But see In re Marriage of Pierce, No. 91 D 16616 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1991)
(litigation papers on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(involving a marriage dissolution petition which included a claim for contribution by
the husband of a pregnant woman against the man who allegedly caused the
pregnancy).
41. Mothers may be under no legal duty to establish the male parentage of
their children, or even to inform known male parents of the birth of their children.
See Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992) (concluding, under
applicable statutes, that the father was not entitled to have notice of his child's
adoption and that the father's consent to the adoption was not required); id. at 108
(Titone, J., concurring) (commenting that it is an "understandable" decision by the
mother to keep the pregnancy secret from the father and not to include him in the
later adoption proceeding).
42. For example, unmarried mothers receiving AFDC must assign support
rights to the state and must cooperate with the state in pursuing those, including
the father, who are responsible for paying for the care and services provided by the
state. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A)-(C) (1988). On the issue of cooperation, see
Douglas v. Babcock, 990 F.2d 875, 876-79 (6th Cir.) (affirming a judgment that a
woman who did not cooperate in establishing the paternity of one child was not
entitled to receive pregnancy related benefits for another), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
86 (1993).
43. See supra note 11 (discussing different forms of statutory presumptions of
paternity). The presumption of fatherhood for a man married to a woman at the
time she bears a child may not arise, however, if the pregnancy was the result of
artificial insemination using the sperm of an anonymous donor, undertaken without
the husband's consent. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 40, § 3 (1992); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 17 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); see also Lawsuit
Gives New Twist to Paternity, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1993, § 1, at 10 (discussing a
woman's suit against her physician for the support of a child rejected by her
estranged husband, where the physician failed to obtain the husband's consent to
the wife's artificial insemination).
44. See Denbow v. Harris, 583 A.2d 205, 207 (Me. 1990) (concluding that a
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husband,45 the biological father,4" or the child 47 may have
standing in a later court proceeding to contest this presump-
tion. Further, although an order in a marriage dissolution
proceeding may designate a married couple as a child's legal
parents, this designation may be challenged in a later pater-
nity action commenced by the child 41 or the alleged biological
father 49  because neither was a party to the dissolution
mother may bring a paternity action against the alleged biological father even
though she was married at the time of conception and a presumption of legitimacy
arose); Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Ohio 1989) (holding that a wife
may rebut the presumption of paternity by clear and convincing evidence). But see
In re Marriage of T, 842 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that in
divorce actions, some presumptive fathers may resist mothers' efforts to disestablish
paternity through blood testing); In re Adoption of R.S.C., 837 P.2d 1089, 1094
(Wyo. 1992) (ruling that a woman was time barred from challenging her former
husband's paternity, where the child was born during the marriage, custody had
been awarded to the husband, and the woman waited almost four years after their
divorce to contest paternity).
45. See A.R. v. C.R., 583 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Mass. 1992) (ruling that in a divorce
proceeding, the husband may adjudicate the issue of paternity); Michael K.T. v Tina
L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 870-72 (W. Va. 1989) (stating that in a divorce proceeding, a
presumed father may disprove paternity and rebut the presumption through the use
of blood test results where equities warrant the admission of such evidence). But
see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 188-189 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that in the
absence of a mother's fraud, a man may not disavow paternity if he knowingly
marries a pregnant woman, and requiring that a husband file suit for the disavowal
of paternity within 180 days after he learned, or should have learned, of the child's
birth); Slagle v. Slagle, 398 S.E.2d 346, 350 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that in the
absence of fraud, a husband was collaterally estopped from modifying the support
provisions of a divorce decree).
46. See C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 370-71 (Mass. 1990) (holding that in a
paternity action, an alleged biological father is required to show that he and the
child have a substantial parent-child relationship and to prove paternity by clear
and convincing evidence, rather than to rebut the husband's presumptive paternity
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Whether an alleged biological father has
standing to raise and rely upon the presumption of paternity has divided courts.
See Privette v. State, 585 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to
follow Pitcairn v. Vowell, 580 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), which held
that the putative father did not have standing to raise and rely upon the
presumption of legitimacy).
47. See In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 338-39 (Kan. 1989) (ruling that in
a child's paternity action against the alleged biological father, the court could
consider a rebuttal of the presumed father's status only if it was in the child's best
interests).
48. See Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ill. 1989) (permitting a child's
paternity action against the alleged biological father to proceed, notwithstanding an
earlier marriage dissolution judgment); Shelton v. An Infant, 406 S.E.2d 421,
422-23 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (same).
49. See Mark Allan B. v. Paula V., 244 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80-82 (Ct. App. 1988)
(permitting an alleged biological father's paternity action to proceed, notwithstand-
ing an earlier marriage dissolution decree, where he had not received notice and
had no opportunity to participate in the prior case), withdrawn, 1988 Cal. LEXIS
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proceeding. Occasionally, even a party to an earlier
dissolution proceeding subsequently may challenge the parent-
age designation.' ° The potential for successive legal desig-
nations and later challenges to paternity determinations
warrants an examination of methods for promoting early and
more comprehensive determinations of male parentage, as well
as mechanisms for consolidating and updating all government-
sponsored determinations of legal paternity.
II. IMPROVING METHODS FOR DESIGNATING
MALE PARENTAGE
What can and should be done about the haphazard, fortu-
itous, and inconsistent ways in which male parents are now
designated under law? Worthy of debate are proposals man-
dating, or at least promoting earlier, more complete, and
more accurate designations of male parentage as of the time
of a child's birth. The proposals that follow suggest improve-
ments in the initial establishment and later amendment of
birth records.
A. Establishing the Birth Record
One way to encourage earlier and more complete designa-
tions of male parentage is to promote the compilation of
complete and accurate birth records shortly after birth by
providing expectant and new mothers and others51 with bet-
ter information concerning the legal consequences of birth.
182 (Cal. May 19, 1988) (denying review and ordering that the opinion not be
published officially).
50. See Jensen v. Runft, 843 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Kan. 1992) (allowing a mother's
paternity action to proceed based on a finding that it was in the child's best inter-
ests to have paternity established, where the issue of paternity was never consid-
ered in an earlier dissolution proceeding, even though the husband did not believe
that the child was his biological offspring and disavowed paternity after the mother
remarried); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 500, 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(upholding a former husband's action in fraud against his former wife to disestab-
lish the paternity determination made in an earlier marriage dissolution proceed-
ing).
51. For example, known spouses and men identified as possible biological
fathers could be provided with this information.
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For example, those providing childbirth services could inform
women about the laws relating to parental duties, 2 including
statutes on presumed fatherhood, the support obligations of
unmarried men, and the duties of biological fathers married
to other women.
5 3
Laws mandating or encouraging earlier, more complete,
and more accurate designations of male parentage as of the
time of a child's birth need not operate exclusively prior to or
immediately after birth. Those interested in a child born
without a legally designated male parent often need time to
consider, discuss, and settle on the consequences of birth.
Additionally, unlike phenylketonuria (PKU) -testing, DNA
and other paternity tests may not be performed on a new-
born.54 Consideration therefore should be given to laws pro-
moting more conclusive designations that operate as long as
one or two years after birth. Under such laws, it is impor-
tant that a man with connections to a child (biologically, by
marriage, or otherwise) has sufficient time to "come forward
to participate" in child rearing5 or to establish a "custodial,
personal or financial relationship."56
To encourage complete and accurate legal designations of
male parentage as of the time of birth, the state could
require periodic inquiry (by state agents, hospital personnel,
or doctors) into the male parentage of a child whose birth
record, without explanation, lacks a male parentage designa-
tion. These inquiries at least should involve the
52. The Pennslyvania statute challenged in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2834 (1992),. required women to be informed by physicians or others
about the legal liability of prospective fathers, except rapists, for their unborn
children. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203(a)(2)(iii) (1990); see also SUPPORTING OUR
CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 121 (reviewing the success of Washington's parentage
acknowledgment outreach program, where "almost four times as many paternity
affidavits were filed in 1991 than were in 1988").
53. This information could be conveyed in a manner similar to that
contemplated in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-23, where doctors would be required to
notify pregnant women of the availability of materials relating to a father's child
support duties, or in 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 2310, § 55.54 (1992), where a statewide
education program on the negative consequences of drug use during pregnancy is
conducted by the Department of Health.
54. Unlike many other blood tests, PKU testing requires only a small blood
sample; samples for PKU testing of infants usually are taken from the heel. On
required PKU testing of all infants, see 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 240, § 1 (1992)
(requiring every newborn to be tested for phenylketonuria, hypothyroidism, and
galactosemia).
55. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
56. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983).
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dissemination of parentage law information which is more
extensive than that provided to all mothers and which
identifies additional government services to assist voluntary
private initiatives in designating a male parent." The
designation of male parentage should not be encouraged by
the state, however, where the birth resulted from criminal
sexual assault, or where the mother reasonably fears abuse
by the father or otherwise has good cause to be left alone.5"
Laws also could encourage earlier, more complete, and
more accurate designations of male parentage as of the time
of a child's birth by requiring an inquiry of female parents5 9
within a certain time after a child's birth to confirm birth
record data. These inquiries also might be used to inform
mothers about the methods of amending any birth records
that were inaccurate when made or that can be deemed inac-
curate because of new medical tests or similar disclosures.
These suggested initiatives are not without drawbacks.
Any inquiry into procreational activities, which inevitably
would accompany state-encouraged or state-mandated desig-
nations of male parentage, raises a host of concerns. The
present freedoms enjoyed by many women regarding male
involvement in their children's lives might be curtailed. The
present freedoms of many men to not be involved in their
children's lives also might be diminished. The constitutional
interests of adults in informational privacy, 0 child rearing, 61
and bodily autonomy" must be balanced carefully with the
57. For example, governments could offer to pay for paternity tests where there
is uncertainty about biological ties.
58. Criminal sexual assault involving consensual intercourse with a minor
might not prevent the designation of male parentage. See infra note 64. Consider
also the exceptions provided in the Pennsylvania law on spousal notification of
abortion which was recently invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-33 (1992). The law provided that a
woman need not notify her husband if her pregnancy was caused by another man or
by spousal sexual assault, or if notice might lead to bodily injury.
59. State officers, medical facilities, or the medical personnel attending the
birth could be designated to make these inquiries.
60. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977) (discussing the federal
constitutional privacy interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" in the
context of health care).
61. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (discussing the
parental interests in directing "the upbringing and education of children under
their control").
62. See In re J.M., 590 So. 2d 565, 569-70 (La. 1991) (discussing the various
constitutional concerns raised where compulsory blood testing is ordered to deter-
mine paternity); A.R. v. C.R., 583 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Mass. 1992) (finding that the
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child's and the government's interests in earlier and more
conclusive designations of male parentage. Undoubtedly,
balancing these freedoms and interests will be difficult. 3
Concerns about promoting only traditional, two-parent
designations also exist. Laws promoting earlier, more complete,
and more accurate designations of male parentage as of the
time of a child's birth should not necessarily require that all
children have at least one male parent designated. A child born
as a result of a rape' or due to artificial insemination by an
anonymous donor 65 may never have a male parent under law.
Similarly, a two-parent setting need not inevitably involve at
least one man. For example, a child born to an unmarried
woman who has been artificially inseminated by an anonymous
donor could have two female parents and no male parent.
66
ordering of blood tests in paternity cases does not violate the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures where there is probable
cause to believe that paternity exists).
63. Consider, for example, the controversy over whether an adoption can
proceed with only the mother's consent where the biological father is unknown to
the state because the mother refuses to identify him. See In re Adoption of S.J.B.,
745 S.W.2d 606, 607-08 (Ark. 1988) (permitting the adoption of a child born to an
unmarried fifteen-year-old to proceed without notice to the biological father, who
'was not interested enough in the outcome of his sexual encounter with this fifteen-
year-old girl to even inquire concerning the possibility of her pregnancy," even
though the father probably did not know of the child's existence and the mother did
not reveal the father's name for reasons of "religion and privacy"); Robert 0. v.
Russell K., 578 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (App. Div.) (finding it "well settled" that a mother
has no obligation to volunteer any information about the biological father during an
adoption), aff'd, 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 273 n.5 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("Absent special circumstances, there is
no bar to requiring the mother of an illegitimate child to divulge the name of the
father when the proceedings at issue involve the permanent termination of the
father's rights."); In re Three Adoption Cases, 16 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1099, 1100
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1989) (ruling that in an adoption case where the biological father is
unknown, "lait a minimum an explanation of the birth mother's refusal to identify
the birth father is warranted").
64. See In re SueAnn A.M., 500 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Wis. 1993) (denying standing
to a father to contest the termination of his parental rights where his child was
conceived during a sexual assault and where he had not established a significant
relationship with the child). But cf. Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (requiring a father who was under the age of consent at the time of
conception to provide child support); Mercer County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Alf M.,
589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Fain. Ct. 1992) (holding that a male victim of statutory rape
was obligated to support the resulting child).
65. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 40, § 3(b) (1992) (providing that a semen donor
is not considered the father of a child conceived with the donor's semen). A married
woman who is artificially inseminated without her husband's consent or his semen
also may bear a child who has no legal father. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 40, § 3(a)
(1992) (requiring a husband's consent before he can be declared the father of a child
conceived through artificial insemination).
66. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Laws also need not limit a child to having only one or two
parents. Some children may benefit if they are designated
legally as having three or more parents as of the time of
birth. In Louisiana, the concept of dual paternity provides
that a mother, a presumed father (a mother's husband at the
time of birth), and a biological father all may have legal
duties to a child, 7 although they may not all have the same
rights of parentage.6 ' Because divorce and remarriage are
commonplace today, many children now have four de facto
parents, although each of the parents may not carry such a
designation under law.
B. Amending the Birth Record
The promotion of earlier and more complete designations of
male parentage should diminish the number of subsequent
inquiries into a child's male parentage as of the time of birth.
Yet, not even a fully completed birth record should foreclose
all later inquiries. For example, the rebuttal of a husband's
presumed paternity should be allowed in some settings.6 9 If a
67. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 855 (La. 1989) (declining to address, in a
filiation action by a mother against a biological father, whether or not child support
may be required of a presumed father who has not disavowed paternity); State ex
rel. Lawrence v. Harrell, 582 So. 2d 940, 941 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a
state-initiated filiation action against a biological father to proceed even though the
presumed father had not disavowed paternity); Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408, 414
(La. Ct. App.) (allowing a biological father to sue to establish paternity even though
the presumed father had not disavowed paternity and therefore remained the
child's legitimate father), cert. denied, 569 So. 2d 981 (La. 1990); see also Judith T.
Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 891, 913 (1992) ("The law should recognize the possibility that a child might
have more than one mother and one father."). Consider, as well, the traditional
rule that a stepfather has an obligation to support his stepchild to the same extent
as a biological father as long as the stepfather's marriage to the mother continues.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1992).
68. See Gnagie v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 603 So. 2d 206,
214 (La. Ct. App.) (denying a presumed father's wrongful death or survival action
arising from a child's death where the presumed father was not a biological parent
and had not developed a parental relationship with the child), cert. denied, 608 So.
2d 174 (La. 1992).
69. Of course, additional proceedings may not be precluded if differing eviden-
tiary burdens attend paternity determinations in different settings. See R.L.J. v.
Western Sprinklers, Inc., 844 P.2d 37, 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that although
paternity may be established by a preponderance of the evidence in a workers'
compensation suit, a higher burden is required in other types of suits).
SPRING 19931
588 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:3
later inquiry into the child's male parentage as of the time of
birth is necessary, efforts should be made to ensure that the
determination is conclusive so that additional proceedings
will be unnecessary. In order for a court determination of
male parentage to be conclusive, it must accord procedural
due process to all persons who have constitutional interests.
7 0
Thus, if male parentage as of the time of a child's birth is
to be designated conclusively during a marriage dissolution
proceeding, the divorcing spouses cannot be the sole parties
to the litigation, just as a petitioning couple and a child are
not the only interested parties in an adoption proceeding.
Adjudications involving a child's male parentage perhaps
should proceed as personal status (or in rem) cases 7' so that
all interested parties can be joined without the usual con-
straints attending nonresident defendants.72
70. In particular, the liberty interests of unmarried men in their biological off-
spring are difficult to assess. See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 549, 559
(La. 1990) (finding that "[tihe interest of a parent in having a relationship with his
children is manifestly a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process guarantee" and declaring a Louisiana statute unconstitutional because
it deprived unwed fatlfers of their parental rights without due process); Robert O. v.
Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that a liberty interest may be
created if a father promptly attempts to establish his parental responsibilities). Of
course, there are often other substantive due process interests involved in court
hearings on parentage, such as informational privacy. See B.J.R.L. v. Utah, 655 F.
Supp. 692, 697-99 (D. Utah 1987) (finding privacy interests in the public disclosure
of information on the bearing of illegitimate children). But see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 7017(c) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that in proceedings to terminate parental
rights prior to an adoption, it is necessary to make an "effort to identify the natural
father," including "inquiry to be made of the mother and any other appropriate
person"); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that not
all interests in the nondisclosure of private information are of a constitutional
dimension); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1526-34 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (employing differing balancing tests when differing informational privacy
interests are infringed, with strict scrutiny reserved for intrusions into especially
intimate or personal areas), aff'd, 946 F.2d 202, 205-07 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering
the reasonable expectation of privacy in information given to the government), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1171 (1992).
71. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977) (noting compliance
with the standard of fairness in "status" cases); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
734-36 (1878) (recognizing the authority of state proceedings to determine the
"status" of one of its citizens towards residents and nonresidents alike); In re
M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, like divorce and
custody proceedings, proceedings to terminate parental rights involve "status" and
fall within the exception to the minimum contacts rule).
72. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 5, § 401(a) (1992) (allowing a marriage
dissolution judgment to be entered where only one of the spouses was a state
resident at the time that the action was filed).
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The results of adjudicatory proceedings in which male
parentage designations from earlier birth certificates are
reexamined should be reflected in those birth records. Later
paternity determinations in marriage dissolution, adoption,
probate, or insurance proceedings should be noted on the
relevant birth records so that all parentage designations are
maintained centrally.73 Such centralization would reduce the
chances of multiple proceedings because formal paternity
determinations would be easy to locate.
Another way to improve the current system for designating
male parentage is to facilitate the amendment of birth
records. Judicial involvement in the amendment of
incomplete or inaccurate records could be eliminated by
deeming sworn affidavits to be sufficient to establish male
parentage as of the time of a child's birth.74 Such affidavits,
as well as unsworn assertions, currently are used in making
many birth records at the time of birth.75
Finally, the ability to challenge birth records that are made
at the time of a child's birth or shortly thereafter should be
limited. Although it may be wise to maintain lengthy limita-
tions periods for challenges brought by or on behalf of chil-
dren,76 certain conduct, or the passage of time, should fore-
close others from seeking to alter earlier designations of male
parentage. Some courts presently bar biological fathers from
participating in adoption proceedings involving their children
because of their failure to provide prebirth or early postbirth
73. Of course, the maintenance of initial and updated parentage records does
not mean that the records would be open to the public. See supra note 18; cf. 21
U.S.C. § 844(b) (1988) (providing for a nonpublic record of drug possession findings
made in administrative hearings).
74. A recent federal commission recommended to Congress that "[sitates shall
have and use laws providing that acknowledgment of parentage be incorporated in
a witnessed, written statement .... In states where the acknowledgment must be
ratified by a tribunal[,]... the tribunal shall have the power to determine parentage
based on the acknowledgment without the necessity of a hearing." SUPPORTING OUR
CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 123; see also Roberts, supra note 21, at 1027-28.
75. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A)(i) (1988) (providing that states participating in
the AFDC program must have "[pirocedures which permit the establishment of the
paternity of any child at any time prior to such child's eighteenth birthday"); H.R.
REP. NO. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) (indicating that advances in scientific
paternity testing eliminate the need for short limitations periods "to prevent stale
claims and to protect a man from having to defend himself against a paternity
action brought years after the child's birth when witnesses may have disappeared
and memories may have become faulty").
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support," or because of their failure to become informed
sooner about the pregnancy or birth.7" Some courts presently
bar presumed fathers from disavowing their parental status
in divorce proceedings because of their children's best inter-
ests,79 their own earlier assumption of parental duties, 80 or
the passage of time.8 ' Further, in the absence of fraud, a
man who marries a pregnant woman with knowledge that he
is not the biological father often may not later deny his male
parentage as of the time of the child's birth.82 After a certain
point in time, it may be best to bar everyone, except perhaps
a child who is proceeding in her own best interests, from
attempting to alter a birth record's designation of male
parentage as of the time of birth.83
This is not to say that biological ties should be considered
irrelevant to legal designations or financial support orders
involving the male parentage of older children. It suggests,
however, that a child's interests typically should be para-
mount in deciding whether to allow a redetermination of that
77. See In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 749 (Fla.) (ruling that a natural
father's consent to his child's adoption was not required because the father aban-
doned the child and made only marginal support efforts before and shortly after the
child's birth), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
78. See In re Petition of Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1271, at *9,
1993 WL 330638, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (terminating a biological
father's parental rights for failure to assume a reasonable degree of concern for the
newborn within 30 days after birth, where the biological father did not follow what
was happening during the pregnancy or after the birth); Robert 0. v. Russell K.,
604 N.E.2d 99, 100, 104 (N.Y. 1992) (ruling that a man who did not know that he
had fathered an out-of-wedlock child until 10 months after the child's adoption
became final could not seek to vacate the adoption because no one prevented him
from finding out about his girlfriend's pregnancy and he failed to act promptly after
the child's birth).
79. See Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 871-72 (W. Va. 1989) (find-
ing that a child's best interests may bar a presumed father from challenging his
parental status where he has held himself out as the father for a sufficient length of
time).
80. See N.P.A. v. W.B.A., 380 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
a husband may be bound to support his wife's illegitimate child if he knowingly and
intentionally entered into such a support agreement with his wife).
81. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (West 1993) (requiring that in most cases,
a husband file suit for disavowal of paternity within 180 days after he learned, or
should have learned, of the child's birth).
82. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1993) (providing that in the
absence of fraud by the mother, a man may not disavow paternity if he knowingly
marries a pregnant woman).
83. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-104(c) (Supp. 1993) ("Any man alleging that he
is the natural father of a child having a presumed father ... may, within six (6)
months of the child's birth ... bring an action . .. to declare his paternity of the
child and ... rebut the presumption ").
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child's male parentage as of the time of birth. Neither a
parent's interests, which often surface only after the
deterioration of a relationship with a person other than the
child, 4 nor the state's interests, which typically involve
financial reimbursement, are so compelling that longstanding
designations of paternity should be open to attack.
Undoubtedly, these suggestions raise some troubling ques-
tions. Promoting earlier, more complete, and more accurate
designations of male parentage would mean that some men
who are biologically linked to children will lose forever the
opportunity to be parents under law through no fault or
misconduct of their own. It also would mean that other men
will bear forever the legal designation of parents because of
their past reliance on false representations about their par-
ental ties. 5 Further, it would mean that some women will
lose their ability to conceal the identities of their children's
biological fathers. These are not insignificant costs. Never-
theless, our present system for designating male parentage
as of the time of a child's birth seems more costly. Govern-
ments and most interested parties have a significant stake in
better assuring that a lasting designation of male parentage
is made for every child at or shortly after the child's birth.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary methods for legally designating male
parentage as of the time of a child's birth require study,
debate, and reform. Presently, too many designations lack
uniformity and occur long after birth, resulting in unneces-
sary surprise and uncertainty for children and parents alike.
84. Thus, in Cain v. Cain, 777 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), without a
finding as to the child's best interests, thetformer husband should not have been
permitted to question his parentage after having a normal parent-child relationship
with the child for 10 years. This paternity challenge came twelve years after the
child's birth and two years after the husband's divorce from the child's mother. The
child's interests should have been paramount, notwithstanding the mother's fraud
in concealing the child's biological roots during her marriage and for two years after
her divorce.
85. See, e.g., Hartman v. Stassis, 504 N.W.2d 129, 130, 134 (Iowa Ct. App.
1993) (imposing a child support duty on a man who claimed that the mother had
conceived children under deceptive circumstances while planning to raise the
children with her lesbian partner).
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Moreover, male parentage adjudications often proceed with-
out involving all interested parties, leaving the resulting
judgments open to later attacks.
Laws should promote earlier, more complete, and more
accurate designations of male parentage as of the time of a
child's birth. In particular, birth-record laws should be
amended to encourage, if not compel, such designations. If a
designation subsequently is reexamined in court during a
marriage dissolution, adoption, probate, or other proceeding,
the resulting designation, to the extent feasible, should be
conclusive so that additional inquiries are foreclosed.
